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Abstract. For the mitigation of long-term pollution threats, one must consider that both the process
of environmental degradation and the switchover to new and cleaner technologies are dynamic.
We develop a model of a uniform good that can be produced by either a polluting technology or
a clean one; the latter is more expensive and requires investment in capacity. We derive the socially
optimal pollution stock accumulation and creation of nonpolluting production capacity, weighing
the tradeoffs among consumption, investment and adjustment costs, and environmental damages. We
consider the effects of changes in the pollution decay rate, the capacity depreciation rate, and the
initial state of the environment on both the steady state and the transition period. The optimal transi-
tion path looks quite different with a clean or dirty initial environment. With the former, investment
is slow and the price of pollution may overshoot the long-run optimum before converging. With the
latter, capacity may overshoot.
Key words: capacity investment, clean technology, pollution accumulation
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1. Introduction
In ongoing debates over how to mitigate long-term pollution threats, there is
common agreement that the adoption of more environmentally friendly techno-
logies is crucial. Environmental economists generally have focused on the creation
of appropriate economic incentives for pollution control that would induce tech-
nology switching as well as reduced consumption of polluting goods and other
mitigating responses. Key questions involve the optimal timing and use of invest-
ments in clean technologies. There is, however, less understanding of how this
process would occur in practice.
In this paper we construct a model that is simple but nonetheless allows us
to consider in some detail the interplay of two dynamic processes, the process of
environmental degradation or improvement, and the process of developing clean
production capacity. The model incorporates both tradeoffs between consump-
tion benefits and environmental damages, and tradeoffs between investment and
operating costs for clean production capacity versus the alternative of reducing
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pollution-creating consumption directly. Consideration of these tradeoffs allows us
to explore how the time path of the pollution shadow price evolves, as well as the
path of clean capacity creation and utilization. In particular, we find that the optimal
trajectory depends importantly on the initial state of the environment: specifi-
cally, itmay depend on whether clean capacity is used to mitigate an immediate
environmental problem or to forestall a future problem.
A number of other papers have explored such issues. In some respects our
analysis resembles those devoted to exploring the creation of backstop resource
production capacity in the face of natural resource exhaustion (see Switzer and
Salant 1986; Krautkraemer 1985; Oren and Powell 1985). Our analysis goes
beyond these frameworks by bringing in pollution decay, thereby introducing a
renewable resource aspect to the problem. A number of papers have considered
problems of pollution accumulation and investment with uncertainty and irreversi-
bility (Kolstad 1996; Ulph and Ulph 1997; Fisher and Narain 2003). Although our
analysis is deterministic, we focus more explicitly and directly on path dynamics
versus steady-state properties. Feichtinger et al. (1994) and Toman and Withagen
(2000) incorporate the possibility of nonconvexities and threshold effects in the
pollution damage function, but they do not focus on the creation of clean produc-
tion capacity. Wirl and Withagen (2000) consider a problem similar to ours, but
they limit attention to clean technologies with variable operating costs that are
lower than those of conventional technologies. In their model, costly investments
in capacity and nonlinearities in pollution assimilation may lead to limit cycles in
the socially optimal path. In contrast, we consider technologies that are more costly
to operate as well as to create. With simple, linear pollution assimilation, although
the steady states are themselves stable, we find that the path to that steady state can
involve overshooting or undershooting of the ultimate pollution or capacity targets
before converging.
By understanding the socially efficient path in this deterministic setting, we can
lay the foundation for incorporating additional complexities and policy constraints.
Since we do not consider market failures other than the pollution externality, our
planning problem can be easily decentralized with an optimal series of emis-
sions taxes. In essence, we focus on the optimal path of those taxes and how it
depends on the state of the environment at the time the policy takes effect. The
research thus addresses part of the ongoing debate about what portfolio of policies
best support socially efficient technology transitions for such problems as climate
change, accumulative pollutants like methyl bromide and other ozone depletors, or
the protection of water bodies from accumulative pollutants.
In the next section, we present a model of production with two technologies, one
with emissions and one with a capacity constraint. We evaluate the steady states
without and with the clean technology option. We then characterize the optimal
paths toward the steady state. In analyzing the optimal trajectory of the shadow
value of emissions, we focus on the role of the initial state of the environment.
We find that starting from a relatively clean environment, the optimal path involves
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an initial interval of time when the backstop technology is put in place but not
actually used, followed by a transition to the simultaneous use of both clean and
dirty technologies. Starting from a sufficiently large stock of pollutants, the clean
technology will be used immediately, but dirty production will be maintained while
clean capacity is expanded. Then there may be a stage in which all production is
carried out using the clean backstop, but eventually both technologies will be used
simultaneously.
Furthermore, there is the possibility of overshooting the steady-state value of
pollution. Starting from a clean state, the environment may need to grow dirtier
than its final state, to ensure enough rents are created to justify the clean technology.
On the other hand, starting with a very dirty environment, one may want to build
more clean capacity than is ultimately needed, in order to speed the transition to
a cleaner environment; this greater capacity may then allow an undershooting of
the steady state. These scenarios are discussion in section 3, and the final section
offers concluding remarks.
2. Model
We consider an economy where consumers’ preferences are affected by three
commodities: consumption, leisure and a stock of pollutants. Consumption
commodities are produced by labor according to two linear technologies, a “dirty”
technology that produces a pollution externality, and a “clean” technology that
emits no pollution, but has a greater labor input requirement and necessitates an
investment in production capacity. The commodities are uniform, and consumers
cannot distinguish which technology produced it.
Dirty production of the consumer commodity is represented by q. Each unit
of output requires c units of the labor input.1 This production method causes
emissions that are proportional to output, with an emissions rate equal to unity.2
The stock of pollution S increases with emissions q and assimilates at a rate of
α > 0.3 The instantaneous net growth in the stock is
S˙(t) = q(t) − αS(t). (1)
Production with the nonpolluting backstop technology is denoted by k. Let K
be installed clean capacity of which k ≤ K is used; clean production is not required
always to operate at capacity. The labor input requirement of clean production is
b. We are considering clean technologies whose capital and operating costs are
higher than those of the dirty technology; thus, we restrict the input costs to b > c.
This restriction means that clean production is only economically viable when the
pollution externality is sufficiently large; furthermore, it allows for the possibility
that dirty and clean production will co-exist in equilibrium. Wirl and Withagen
(2000) consider a case in which the clean technology has no (and thereby lower)
operating costs, but requires a fixed installation cost; an example of this type would
be solar power. Therefore these cost assumptions are not innocuous.
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Installing additional capacity I incurs a labor cost f (I ), which is assumed to
satisfy
f (0) = 0; f (I ) > 0, I > 0; f ′(0) = 0;f ′(I ) > 0, I > 0;f ′′ > 0. (A1)
An important assumption is that f ′(0) = 0; although somewhat unrealistic, it is
a major analytical simplification. It can be justified if we think of our model
as approximating the choice over a broad range of clean technologies, some of
which have low installation costs (e.g., in-house process improvements) but limited
capacity.4 Disinvestment, other than through depreciation, can be safely disre-
garded, since there is no cost (including no opportunity cost) of maintaining excess
capacity.5
Let δ be the rate of depreciation in the capital stock. Therefore, the instan-
taneous change in capacity is
K˙(t) = I (t) − δK(t). (2)
We assume that the initial stock of the backstop technology equals zero: K(0) = 0.
Instantaneous welfare of the representative agent at time t is given by
W(C(t), L¯ − L(t), S(t)), in which C is total consumption, L is the labor input,
and the initial endowment of labour is L¯. In the sequel we will be interested in
social welfare in a dynamic utilitarian setting. Therefore the objective function can
be written as
SW =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtW(C(t), L¯ − L(t), S(t))dt
where ρ is the rate of time preference. Hence the problem is to maximize SW
subject to the constraints
C(t) = q(t) + k(t)
L(t) = cq(t) + bk(t) + f (I (t)) ≤ L¯
as well as the equations of motion for the stock variables.
The structure of the instantaneous welfare function matters for the outcome:
the degree of substitutability between the constituent parts of the instantaneous
welfare function matters (see Michel and Rotillon 1995). As discussed in Toman
and Withagen (2000), assuming additively separable consumption utility and pollu-
tion damage is not innocuous but very convenient analytically. In view of eliciting
transparent results from this two-state-variable model, we have chosen to employ
this simplification, whereby the welfare function is strongly separable and even
quasi-linear:
W(C(t), L¯ − L(t), S(t)) = U(C(t)) + L¯ − L(t) − D(S(t)).
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The function U represents utility from consumption, with U ′(C) > 0 for all C >
0, U ′(0) = ∞, U ′(∞) = 0 and U ′′ < 0. The function D is the damage flow from
the stock of pollution, with D(0) = 0, D′(S) > 0 for S > 0, D′(0) = 0 and D′′ >
0. Utility from leisure is linear. We assume that the labor endowment is sufficient
to ensure an interior solution (i.e., that the marginal utility when consuming all
possible output is less than the marginal utility of leisure, or U ′(L¯/c) < 1).
The planner chooses q(t), k(t), and I (t) for t ∈ [0,∞) to maximize the
discounted value of consumption of the good net of production and pollution costs:
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt (U(q(t) + k(t)) − cq(t) − bk(t) − f (I (t)) − D(S(t)))dt (3)
subject to (1), (2), S(0) = S0, K(0) = 0, q(t) ≥ 0, k(t) ≥ 0, I (t) ≥ 0, and also the
capacity constraint: k(t) ≤ K(t).
The current-value Hamiltonian for this two-state optimal control problem is
H(S,K, q, k, I, ψ, ϕ) =
U(q + k) − cq − bk − f (I ) − D(S) + ψ[q − αS] + ϕ[I − δK]. (4)
Incorporating the capacity constraint, we get the following Lagrangian:6
L(S,K, q, k, I, ψ, ϕ, λ) = H(S,K, q, k, I, ψ, ϕ) + λ[K − k]. (5)
To describe the optimum, we have the first-order complementary slackness
conditions with respect to the control variables. In each of the following pairs,
one of the equations must hold with equality:
q ≥ 0, U ′(q + k) ≤ c + τ ; (6)
k ≥ 0, U ′(q + k) ≤ b + λ; (7)
I ≥ 0, f ′(I ) ≤ ϕ; (8)
where τ ≡ −ψ to express what would be a negative shadow value of pollution as
a shadow cost. In view of the Inada conditions on the instantaneous utility func-
tion, consumption will be positive at all instants of time. We obtain the remaining
necessary conditions for an optimum:
τ˙ = (α + ρ)τ − D′(S), (9)
ϕ˙ = (δ + ρ)ϕ − λ, (10)
λ ≥ 0, K ≥ k, λ[K − k] = 0. (11)
This yields the following preliminary results. First, from the maximization
of the Hamiltonian, we find that if there is production of the dirty commodity,
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marginal utility (“price”) of the good equals social marginal costs of production,
inclusive of the cost of the pollution externality (c+τ ). Second, use of the backstop
technology requires that marginal utility of the commodity at least equal the direct
marginal production costs (b), and the difference between them determines the
shadow value of the capacity constraint in that period.
Third, to have positive investment in capacity in any period, (8) says that the
marginal cost of installation must equal the shadow value of added capacity. That
value is determined by the present value of future capacity constraints to clean
production, discounted by the rates of time preference and depreciation. We show
that the shadow value of capacity is positive – and thereby so is investment – as
long as capacity is constrained at some point now or in the future:
LEMMA 1. If there exists t1 such that I (t1) > 0, then I (t) > 0 for all t < t1.
Proof. I (t1) > 0 if and only if ϕ(t1) > 0. If ϕ(t) ≤ 0 for any t < t1, then according
to (10) with λ ≥ 0, ϕ˙(t + s) < 0 for all s > 0, which contradicts ϕ(t1) > 0. 
In other words, if one will want to invest and have capacity in the future, one will
want to smooth investment costs by installing some capacity all along the way,
taking advantage of the low part of the marginal cost curve. The problem at hand
is of course interesting only if in the steady state the backstop is actually used
(because otherwise we would be back in the case of no backstop), implying positive
investments to keep capacity constant. This will happen if the use of the backstop
technology is not too costly, and in section 2.1.2, we will make this precise. Then
it follows that there will occur positive investments over the entire trajectory.
2.1. STEADY STATE ANALYSIS
In the steady state, the stocks of pollution and clean capacity are constant. Let us
define q∗ and I ∗ as the solutions to S˙ = 0 and K˙ = 0, respectively:
q∗ = αS∗ (12)
I ∗ = δK∗ (13)
where S∗ and K∗ represent the corresponding solutions to the necessary conditions.
Thus, in any steady state with dirty production, emissions just equal the environ-
ment’s capacity to assimilate and capacity installation just replaces depreciation.
Clearly, I ∗ > 0 unless K∗ = 0, which we show below is not the case.
In the steady state, since K and I are constant, it follows from (8) that ϕ is
constant. With a constant S we can solve the differential equation for τ . If τ goes
to infinity, then consumption goes to zero, which is suboptimal. Nor should τ go to
−∞. Therefore τ goes to a constant. Thus, from τ˙ = ϕ˙ = 0, we get
τ ∗ = D
′(S∗)
ρ + α ; (14)
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λ∗ = (ρ + δ)f ′(δK∗). (15)
Equation (14) states that the steady-state shadow cost of emissions equals the
present value of marginal damages, discounted by the rate of time preference and
the assimilation rate. Existence of a finite shadow cost and finite pollution stock
will be assured by our assumption of a constant α; Toman and Withagen (2000)
focus on cases in which the assimilation rate is a function of the pollution stock.
They find that if the assimilative capacity of the environment can be depleted
(dα/dS < 0), an optimal solution involving pollution abatement is not assured
to exist or to be unique. We focus instead on the role of the second state variable;
Equation (15) reveals that the steady-state shadow value of capacity equals the
marginal replacement cost of capital, annualized by the rate of time preference and
depreciation. In an equilibrium with both technologies, these values will be linked
by the utility of consumption.
2.1.1. Steady state without backstop
As a reference case, it is useful to characterize the steady state in the absense of the
backstop technology. That is, what is the optimal policy if only dirty production is
available, or clean production is prohibitively costly? In fact, we will use this case
to define the latter threshold. If the backstop is unavailable or unused, then K∗ =
0, which implies from (15) no shadow value to capital, λ∗ = 0, and from (7) that
U ′(q∗) ≤ b since k∗ = 0. In other words, clean production must be too expensive
to be useful.
From (14), we see that τ ∗, which represents the present value of marginal
damages in the steady state, is an upward-sloping function of the pollution stock.
From the first-order condition with respect to q we have
τ = U ′(αS) − c (16)
which is a strictly downward-sloping function of the pollution stock. Thus, these
two functions intersect only once and there exists a unique steady state that is
asymptotically stable. Define S∗D as the steady-state stock of pollution in this no-
backstop case, satisfying
U ′(αS∗D) − c =
D′(S∗D)
α + ρ . (17)
The comparative statics are straightforward. We have
[D′′(S) − αU ′′(αS)(α + ρ)]dS =
[U ′(αS) − c + U ′′(αS)(α + ρ)S]dα + [U ′(αS) − c]dρ − [α + ρ]dc. (18)
Hence, in view of the properties of the functions involved, higher production
costs entail a smaller stock of pollutants in the steady state. A higher rate of time
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preference leads to greater steady-state pollution. The impact of increasing the
assimilation rate is ambiguous, however, since it reduces the marginal damage
of current emissions and allows greater consumption, but the marginal utility of
that consumption is diminishing. Although more transparent in the single-state
problem, these basic results will remain in the two-state problem.
2.1.2. Steady state with backstop
We began with the assumption that the clean technology is more costly to use than
the dirty one, else itwould be used in the absence of pollution. We now further
restrict our consideration to clean production that is also less costly than the social
marginal cost of only dirty production. Thus, we assume
c < b < c + τ ∗D. (A2)
The interpretation is straightforward. The right-hand side gives the marginal
costs of an additional unit of production of the dirty commodity, namely the direct
production costs plus the marginal pollution costs, in the absence of a backstop. If
the marginal cost of producing an additional unit of the consumption commodity
with the clean technology were never less, it would not be optimal to develop clean
production. The exception would be when the initial stock of pollutants is higher
than S∗D, in which case the use of clean technologies could be cost-effective during
the transition to the steady state. This possibility is discussed later.
We state the following lemmata to characterize the steady state with the clean
backstop. First, with α > 0, some dirty production must exist in the steady state.
LEMMA 2. q∗ > 0.
Proof. Suppose q∗ = 0. From (6), then U ′(k∗) ≤ c + τ ∗. From(12), S∗ = 0. This
implies that τ ∗ = 0, so that U ′(k∗) ≤ c. But from (7), U ′(k∗) ≥ b > c. 
In other words, if dirty production ceased, assimilation would eventually cause the
environment to become completely clean. In that case, society could save costs by
switching some production to the dirty technology, as the burden imposed by the
extra emissions would be less than the savings in operating costs.
Next, some clean capacity will exist in the steady state, and all of it will be
utilized:
LEMMA 3. K∗ > 0 and k∗ = K∗.
Proof. Suppose K∗ = 0. Then k∗ = 0. We have q∗ = αS∗ > 0. Then from (7)
and and (15), U ′(αS∗) ≤ b. Moreover, (6) implies that U ′(αS∗) = c + τ ∗, with
τ ∗ = D′(S∗)/(ρ + α). Hence τ ∗ = τ ∗D, but by (A2) b < c + τ ∗D , a contradiction.
Suppose k∗ < K∗. Then λ∗ = 0 = ϕ∗ = K∗, which would violate K∗ > 0. 
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Thus, an immediate consequence of having capacity is that no excess capacity
exists in the steady state. Otherwise, one could save on installation costs by
investing less.
Now we can compare the steady states in the respective cases by means of a
graph. From the first-order conditions for both production types, we get
U ′(K∗ + αS∗) = c + D
′(S∗)
ρ + α ; (19)
U ′(K∗ + αS∗) = b + (ρ + δ)f ′(δK∗). (20)
Let us consider these equations in detail, omitting ∗ when there is no danger of
confusion.
Consider (19) first. If S = 0, then K satisfies U ′(K) = c (because D′(0) = 0). If
K = 0, then S follows from U ′(αS) = c+D′(S)/(ρ+α). The locus of intermediate
points is shown in Figure 2 as the curve “q f.o.c.”
Consider (20). If S = 0, then K satisfies U ′(K) = b + (ρ + δ)f ′(δK) > c. If
K = 0, then S follows from U ′(αS) = b. The locus of corresponding intermediate
points is shown in Figure 2 as the curve “k f.o.c.”
Deriving the respective slopes of these curves, we can see that “q f.o.c.” is
steeper than “k f.o.c.”:
dK
dS
∣∣∣∣
∂H
∂q
=0
= D
′′/(ρ + α) − αU ′′
U ′′
, (21)
dK
dS
∣∣∣∣
∂H
∂k
=0
= −αU
′′
U ′′ − (ρ + δ)δf ′′ . (22)
Note that D′′/(ρ + α) − αU ′′ > −αU ′′ and U ′′ − (ρ + δ)δf ′′ < U ′′ < 0.
Thus, the two curves (drawn in Figure 1 as lines) cross, and cross only once. A
steady state exists, and it is unique and (at least locally) asymptotically stable.
As noted above, with c + τ ∗D > b, some clean production exists in the steady
state. In terms of the figure, if that condition did not hold, the “k f.o.c.” line would
lie wholly inside “q f.o.c.” We also assume that c < b, so some dirty production
must also exist. Otherwise, “q f.o.c.” line would lie wholly inside “k f.o.c.” and no
intersection would occur.
2.2. CHARACTERIZATION OF OPTIMAL PATHS
From the optimality conditions, we can characterize the paths to the steady state.
Let us define two particular steady-state values of capacity which will establish
some bounds for the optimal path. First, let K¯ satisfy U ′(K¯) = b+ (ρ +δ)f ′(δK¯),
which is the steady-state value of capacity when the economy only has the clean
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Figure 1. Steady state with backstop.
technology at its disposal. Hence, K¯ is an upper bound on installed backstop
capacity, also in the case where dirty technology is available. Second, we define
(Kˆ, Sˆ) by U ′(Kˆ + αSˆ) = b, D′(Sˆ)/(ρ + α) = b − c. These represent the steady-
state stock values if there were no investment costs (f = 0) or no depreciation
(δ = 0).
In principle, there are eight possible regimes, as listed in this table.
Regime K k q
I k 0 0
II k 0 > 0
III k > 0 0
IV k > 0 > 0
V > k 0 0
VI > k 0 > 0
VII > k > 0 0
VIII > k > 0 > 0
However, only a few regimes are possible for an optimal path. We can quickly
eliminate regimes I, II, V, VII, and VIII:
Regimes I and V imply no production at all, which cannot occur along an
optimum, since U ′(0) = ∞. Regime II has only dirty production and no capacity
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building – it cannot occur along an optimal path that ultimately involves clean
production, as it would violate Lemma 1, that some investment smoothing always
occurs. Regime VII has excess capacity with no dirty production – it implies
that capacity was created that would never be used, which is clearly suboptimal.
Formally, if regime VII prevails at time t , then U ′(k(t)) = b (since λ(t) = 0)
and U ′(K(t)) < b. There occurs time s such that k(s) = K(t), because the
capacity that is built up must be used at some instant of time. Hence, b + λ(s) =
U ′(k(s)+ q(s)) = U ′(K(t)+ q(s)) ≤ U ′(K(t)) < b, contradicting that λ(s) ≥ 0.
In regime VIII, which has dual production and excess capacity, we have λ = 0
and U ′(q + k) = b = c + τ ; hence, τ˙ = 0 and S = Sˆ, which implies k = Kˆ. A
sufficient condition to exclude this regime is
K¯ < Kˆ, (A3)
which we thus assume for analytical convenience.7 Regime VIII would then violate
the upper bound on installed capacity.
The analysis thus leads to the conclusion that there are only three regimes to be
considered as candidates for an optimal path:
Regime III has only clean production occurring at capacity. It may be possible
when starting with a dirty environment, as discussed in section 3.2.
Regime IV has both dirty production and clean production at capacity.
Regime VI has only dirty production but clean capacity available. As shown in
section 3.1, this regime can occur when starting from a relatively clean
environment, smoothing installation costs in anticipation of needing clean
production.
Moreover some transitions between III, IV, and VI can be ruled out. The
following lemma will prove useful for the subsequent proposition:
LEMMA 4. τ(t) < b − c implies τ˙ (t) > 0.
Proof. From (7), τ(t) < b − c implies k(t) = 0. Hence the system is governed by
(6), (9) and (1). If τ(t) < τ ∗D , as in assumption 2, and τ˙ (t) < 0, the system will
remain in the region with τ(t) < b − c forever, which, in the case at hand implies
that the backstop will never be used, a contradiction. 
PROPOSITION 1. There is no direct transition possible from regime III to regime
VI in an optimum.
Proof. In regime III we have U ′(K) ≤ c + τ and U ′(K) = b + λ, implying
τ ≥ b − c. In regime VI we have U ′(q) = c + τ and U ′(q) ≤ b, implying
τ ≤ b − c. Suppose there is a transition from regime III to regime VI at time t .
Then, since τ˙ ≥ 0 as long as τ ≤ b − c (lemma 4), we have τ = b − c < τ ∗D
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in view of assumption 2. So, U ′(αS) = τ + c < τ ∗D + c implying S > S∗D and
D′(S)/(α + ρ) = b − c < τ ∗D implying S < S∗D, a contradiction. 
PROPOSITION 2. There is no direct transition possible from regime VI to regime
III in an optimum.
Proof. Suppose there is a transition from regime VI to regime III at time t . Then,
since consumption is continuous over time, U ′(K(t)) = U ′(q(t)) = b. But this
implies K(t) > K¯ , violating the definition of K¯ as the upper bound on installed
capacity. 
With those regimes and propositions established, we can describe the equilibrium
path. Suppose the initial stock of pollutants is small. Then it is optimal to have an
initial interval of time when the backstop technology is put in place but not actually
used (regime VI). All consumption comes from the conventional technology. After
some time a transition is made to the simultaneous use of both technologies (regime
IV).
Suppose the initial stock of pollutants is huge. Then there will be an
initial, short, interval of time where there is simultaneous use of both tech-
nologies. This is the case because it has been assumed that initially there
is no backstop technology installed and U ′(0) = ∞, so some consump-
tion from the old technology is needed at the outset. In the second stage all
production may be carried out in the backstop (regime III). This cannot go
on forever, and eventually there will be simultaneous use of both technologies
(regime IV).
3. Optimal Trajectories
In this section we describe the optimal trajectories under different circumstances.
It turns out that it is important to make a distinction between small and high initial
stocks of pollutants.
3.1. SMALL INITIAL STOCK OF POLLUTANTS
The optimal path can be characterized by several phases, described below.8
3.1.1. Dirty production, rising pollution
If the initial stock of pollutants is small, the shadow price of pollution is also small,
and it will not be optimal to use the backstop technology immediately. During this
initial period, while τ < b − c, we have regime VI: there is only dirty production
and τ rises along with the pollution stock. Any existing capacity will not be utilized
since U ′(q) = c+ τ < b. However, this does not imply that there is no installation
of clean production capacity. According to Lemma 1, the existence of any positive
level of investment at any time in the future along the optimal path will trigger
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some current investment. One always wants to take advantage of negligible costs
at low levels of capacity installation.
3.1.2. Dual production, rising pollution
The first phase is followed by a period in which there is dual production, character-
ized by regime IV. After τ = b− c, the existing backstop technology comes online
and is used at capacity. At the start of this period, there is a downward jump in dirty
production. The stock of pollution will continue to increase in the beginning of this
period, but at a slower rate than before. The shadow price of pollution continues to
rise, and capacity expansion also continues.
3.1.3. Dual production, overshooting
For relatively low rates of capacity depreciation, the shadow value of pollution
will actually overshoot its steady-state value. In other words, the environment may
have to grow dirtier before it can become cleaner. We develop this intuition by
momentarily relaxing the assumption that δ > 0.9
LEMMA 5. If δ = 0, there exists t1 > 0, such that τ(t1) > τ ∗.
Proof. If δ = 0, it follows from (19) and (20) that τ ∗ = b − c. Suppose that τ(t) ≤
b − c for all t . Then λ(t) ≤ 0 for all t . Obviously, λ < 0 is impossible, and λ = 0
for all t implies that ϕ = 0 (else ϕ˙ = ρϕ from (10) implies that ϕ → ∞, which is a
contradiction). If ϕ = 0 for all t then I = 0 and K = 0 for all time and all production
is dirty. However, with only dirty production, the steady state is τ ∗D > b − c (by
A2), which contradicts the supposition. 
The economic meaning is that the socially optimal price of the dirty good must at
some point rise higher than the variable cost of clean technology (b) if installation
of clean capacity is ever to be worthwhile. It is that excess price differential that
generates the investment rents and the positive shadow value to investment. Lemma
5 shows that in the special case of zero backstop capital depreciation, generating
those rents necessitates an overshooting of the steady-state value of the consump-
tion commodity. By continuous dependence on parameters, overshooting also will
occur with positive but moderate depreciation rates.
With higher depreciation rates, however, the shadow price may not necessarily
overshoot the steady state value, since τ ∗ itself is well above b−c and high steady-
state investment is needed to maintain capacity. This potential case is portrayed in
the Figure 3.
It is instructive to go into the economic intuition behind overshooting. The
question of overshooting is whether the consumption commodity price would reach
the steady-state level before enough time has passed to get sufficient capacity in
place. This result is obvious when the initial pollution stock is high enough. If
S0 = S∗ and K0 = 0, then it must be that τ(0) > τ ∗, since the dirty output
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Figure 2. Price path with no depreciation.
Figure 3. Price path with high depreciation.
level that satisfies consumption at U ′(q) = c + τ ∗ is greater than q∗, which would
drive up the pollution stock. Similarly, for somewhat lower initial pollution stocks,
overshooting must also occur.
However, even with a very clean start, overshooting is still possible. Consider
the case of a low capital depreciation rate, which also implies a low τ ∗. If τ did
not rise above τ ∗, that would also imply a path of very low shadow values of
investment. Still, one could take advantage of low initial installation costs and let
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capacity build up very slowly over a nearly infinite horizon. However, the fact that
the clean option will be there at some point creates incentives to build up pollution
more quickly than in the no-backstop case. Let the subscript D denote the path
in the case of only dirty production. Since S∗D > S∗, then SD(td) = S∗ at some
finite td . Since τ(t) ≤ τD(t) for all t , C(t) ≥ CD(t) for all t . Let tc be the point at
which clean capacity becomes utilized: τ(tc) = b − c. Since C(t) = q(t) for all
t < tc, then S(t) ≥ SD(t) for all t < tc. Since SD(tc) < SD(td), then tc < td , and
that point is reached in finite time along the optimal path. However, that implies
that K(tc) would still be very small, and negligible clean capacity means greater
dirty production continues. If K(t) < C(t) − CD(t) for tc < t < td , then it
also follows that S(td) > SD(td) = S∗, which implies overshooting. When τ ∗
is high, it is more likely that K(tc) > C(tc) − CD(tc), since more incentive to
create capacity is in place, and the price differential between the backstop and
no-backstop cases is smaller; then it is possible that the displacement of dirty
production at that point is sufficient to stem the growth in pollution and allow for a
transition to the steady state without overshooting. However, when τ ∗ is low, it is
more likely that insufficient clean capacity is available compared to demand early
on, and pollution is allowed to expand beyond the steady state level, expecting that
more dirty production will be displaced later on in the time horizon.
We have here a joint implication, that for the shadow value of pollution to be
higher at its peak than in the steady state, it must be that the stock of pollution is
greater than the steady-state level at some point between there and the steady state.
PROPOSITION 3. S overshoots S∗ if τ overshoots τ ∗, and vice versa.
Proof. If τ(t) peaks at t = t1, then τ˙ (t1) = 0. From (9), τ(t1) = D′(S(t1))/(α+ ρ).
Since τ(t1) > τ ∗, then S(t1) > S∗: the pollution stock overshoots the steady if
its shadow cost does. To see the reverse, suppose that S(0) < S∗, S(t) ≤ S∗ for
0 ≤ t < t2, and S(t) > S∗ for t2 ≤ t ≤ t3 for some t3 > t2. Suppose also
that τ(t) ≤ τ ∗ for all t . First, we show that this latter assumption implies that
clean production is always less than the steady state value. In view of f ′(0) = 0,
K(t) > 0 for t > 0. If K(t) > k(t), then λ(t) = 0 < λ∗. If K(t) = K(t), then from
(6) and (7), λ(t) = c − b + τ(t) ≤ c − b + τ ∗. Thus, λ(t) ≤ λ∗ for all t ≥ 0.
Consider (10); if ϕ(t) > ϕ∗ for some t ≥ 0, then ϕ(t) → ∞ as t → ∞, which
is not optimal. Hence, ϕ(t) ≤ ϕ∗ for all t ≥ 0, and from (2) and (8), K(t) ≤ K∗
for all t ≥ 0. Next, we show that this implies that the pollution stock would grow
indefinitely if it overshoots. Since K(t) ≤ K∗ and τ(t) ≤ τ ∗ for all t ≥ 0, we
have q(t) ≥ q∗ for all t ≥ 0. This implies that S(t) ≥ S∗ for all t ≥ t2. Moreover,
S(t) > S∗ for t2 ≤ t ≤ t3 for some t3 > t2 by assumption. It then follows from (9)
that τ(t) becomes negative eventually, which contradicts optimality. 
In other words, shadow price overshooting goes hand in hand with pollution
overshooting. However, we will see next that the timing is not simultaneous.
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3.1.4. Dual production, convergence
In a final phase the shadow price of pollution starts converging to the steady state.
If clean capacity depreciates rapidly enough, the pollution stock may rise mono-
tonically along with the shadow price of pollution. If τ overshoots its steady-state
value, it must necessarily hit a peak and then decline as it converges. In this case,
the pollution stock must also peak and then decline to its steady-state level.
LEMMA 6. If τ(t) peaks at t = t1, then S(t) peaks at t = t2 > t1.
Proof. Consider any pairs of points tx < t1 < ty such that τ(tx) = τ(ty). Since
tx is on the rise to the peak and ty is on the decline to the steady state, τ˙ (tx) > 0
and τ˙ (ty) < 0. Thus, from (9), D′(S(tx)) < D′(S(ty)), implying S(tx) < S(ty).
Taking an infinitely small interval ε, since S(t1 − ε) >> S(t1 + ε), it must be that
S continues to rise after t1. Since we know it must peak in order to decline to the
steady-state stock, we get t1 < t2 < ∞. 
In other words, the time before τ peaks is closer to a period of higher pollution
stocks, and the time after τ peaks is closer to the steady state of lower pollution
stocks. Thus, to have the present discounted value of marginal pollution damages
equal at those two points before and after, it must be that the pollution stock is
higher at the point after. Correspondingly, the shadow value of pollution begins to
decline before the actual pollution stock does, when overshooting occurs.
We also note that convergence to the steady state need not be monotonic.
Considering the eigenvalues of the Jacobian, evaluated in the steady state, we find
that they can be complex for some parameter values. Consequently, with two eigen-
values having negative real part, this implies a (locally) stable cycle towards the
steady state. This phenomenon is interesting because it implies overshooting and
undershooting of capacity as well as pollution in the neighborhood of the steady
state. The economic intuition is that when pollution is at the steady state value,
whereas clean capacity is below its steady state value, it pays to increase pollution
and at the same time increase capacity. Once capacity is at the steady state level and
pollution is still high, capacity is built up further and pollution can be reduced. But
then when pollution is at its steady state value again and capacity is high, capacity
as well as pollution can be decreased. The analysis of this section, however, has
focused mainly on behavior not too close to the steady state; furthermore, we call
attention to how the paths of capacity investment and pollution damages differ
depending on whether the initial pollution stock is relatively high or low.
3.2. LARGE INITIAL STOCK OF POLLUTION
Suppose now that one inherits a pollution stock that is relatively large, such that
S(0) > S∗ along an optimal path. For example, one may begin from a no-policy
steady state, SN , such that U ′(αSN) = c. Then one starts to implement both the
environmental pricing policy and the capacity investments simultaneously, as the
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environment had become far too dirty in the absence of intervention. Although the
steady state does not vary according to the initial pollution stock, the transition can
look quite different.
Starting with a large pollution stock, we have a sequence of several possible
stages: dual production and rapid capacity expansion, clean production alone, dual
production with capacity overshooting, and convergence.
3.2.1. Dual production, rapid investment
With a very dirty initial environment, τ(0) > τ ∗D > b − c, clean capacity
and production are immediately justified. First, there will be an initial period of
simultaneous clean and dirty production (regime IV), with much of the weight of
environmental recovery carried by curtailment of total (mostly dirty) consumption
as its social cost is internalized. Along the path, then, we will see reduction in
pollution and shadow price and a rapid buildup in clean capacity. Until (and unless)
sufficient capacity exists to displace dirty production, we start and remain in this
regime.
3.2.2. Clean production
Once enough capacity is built, the economy may pass into a regime III path (k =
K > 0 = q), relying on clean production to allow environmental recovery. During
this time, c + τ(t) > U ′(K(t)), and the latter is bounded by U ′(K¯) at the lowest.
Passing through this regime depends on the extent of initial pollution and how
slowly the environment recovers compared with how quickly capacity can be built.
3.2.3. Capacity overshooting and convergence
Clean capacity may increase monotonically to the steady state, its growth slowed as
the environment recovers and some dirty production is reintroduced. But it is also
possible that clean capacity will overshoot the steady state. The argument extends
from the case in which c+ τ ∗D = b, such that dirty production just satisfies demand
at the steady state with social costs internalized. Starting from a relatively clean
environment, no clean capacity would be built. With a dirty environment, however,
c + τ(0) > b, signaling for clean capacity to be built. Later it is depreciated away
as the economy converges toward the steady state. Similarly, for other cases with
small K∗ is but large S0, it will be important to clean up as soon as possible and we
will have some K(t) > K∗.
Capacity overshooting is quite possible with either high or low depreciation
rates. Low depreciation rates mean that capacity that was installed to speed
environmental recovery lingers afterward, allowing for net disinvestment when
pollution is sufficiently assimilated. High depreciation rates make capacity installa-
tion more like a variable cost of clean production. Consider the extreme case of a
very high δ. Starting from SN , capacity is immediately put in place to displace some
or all of the dirty production. That in turn causes the pollution stock to decline,
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Figure 4. Optimal paths with large S0.
which induces installation (and thereby capacity) to decline monotonically toward
the steady state. Thus, for high rates of depreciation, the path may follow regime
IV throughout or pass from III to IV.
It may be possible for pollution to overshoot the steady state as well. We
speculate that pollution undershooting could occur in the low depreciation case:
clean capacity that was installed when the environment was very dirty lingers a
long time, continuing to displace dirty production even once marginal damages are
smaller. With k > k∗ and declining slowly, we have q < αS∗ for longer, possibly
long enough to allow τ (and implicitly, but not simultaneously, S) to fall below
the steady-state value. With net disinvestment of clean capacity – although some
investment always occurs if capacity will be used in the future, it may not replace
depreciation – dirty production rises again, converging to the steady state.
Figure 4 portrays possible paths when starting from a dirty pollution stock. As
previously noted, a stable cycle to the steady state is also possible.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we have developed as simple a model as possible that still captures the
dynamics of pollution accumulation or decay and capital accumulation for clean
technology. We look mainly at the case in which both clean and dirty production
coexist in the socially optimal steady state. If the clean technology has a dominant
cost advantage over the dirty technology and one’s pollution damage costs are
internalized, then of course the clean technology will displace the dirty technology
as soon as capacity can be accumulated (leaving aside other possible market fail-
ures related to technology diffusion that are not addressed in this paper). And if
utilizing the clean technology makes economic sense only in a highly polluted
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environment, it naturally follows that this technology will not have a future once
the environment recovers.
Although the steady state in our model is invariant with respect to initial
conditions (given depreciable capacity and pollution assimilation), the transition
paths are very different. The initial state of the environment affects the urgency
of action, interacting with the lifespan of capital and creating both immediate
and enduring effects on the tradeoffs between environmental protection through
curtailed consumption and capacity expansion. As a result, the optimal path may
involve over- or undershooting the long-run targets for managing a stock pollutant.
With a clean initial environment, clean capacity is built up gradually, and it
is possible that the environmental shadow price and pollution stock will over-
shoot long-run levels. With low rates of depreciation, the long life of installed
capacity leads to more clean production being maintained in equilibrium. Recog-
nizing that marginal damages of pollution will ultimately be lower, society is in
less of a hurry to install clean capacity and abate emissions. In fact, the optimal
strategy is more likely to be to allow the environment to get dirtier before it gets
cleaner, saving investment costs by smoothing capacity expansion, and reducing
and displacing dirty production more gradually. On the other hand, if capital
depreciates more quickly, less clean capacity will be available in equilibrium.
Consequently, marginal damages will be higher, causing the optimal near-term
policy to be more aggressive, cutting back on dirty production and building up
capacity more quickly, with no need for overshooting.
With a dirty environment, clean capacity will be built up rapidly since it is
worth utilizing as soon as the environmental policy begins, while dirty production
is immediately curtailed. However, since the immediate needs are greater than the
steady-state capacity needs, the clean technology may overshoot its long-run level.
If capacity is enduring, it remains long after the initial period of austerity, perhaps
allowing the environment to become cleaner for a while, until the extra capacity
depreciates and is replaced again with more dirty production.
Dynamic optimization models with two or more state variables always are
somewhat technically vexing, and ours is no exception. Although the necessary
simplifications leave something to be desired, it is interesting to note that unusual
path dynamics can be generated using simple welfare specifications and well-
behaved functions. The results can offer some intuition about incorporating more
complicated interactions. For example, if dirty production has a capacity constraint
as well, those additional incentives would resemble the clean capacity incentives
described here, and the path to the steady state would further depend on the initial
capacity and lifespan of the polluting technology. Positive marginal investment
costs would imply that invesment might not be continuous – the social cost of dirty
production would have to pass a positive hurdle price before capacity would begin
to be installed. Allowing for production costs to change over time through tech-
nological progress would raise other interesting issues – the expectation of lower
costs of clean production in the future would tend to exacerbate the overshooting
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results, unless perhaps progress is highly endogenous, as with learning by doing,
which changes the optimal timing of action. Extensions of our results could be
obtained by relaxing the simplifying assumptions and using numerical simulations
(parameterized to actual industries) to study the resulting investment dynamics.
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Notes
1. Effectively, we assume that capacity investment for dirty technology is either unnecessary, cost-
less, or does not depreciate and is sufficiently installed that dirty production is unconstrained
when the policy begins. The problem is already quite complex with two state variables. However,
intuition about the effects of capacity investment for dirty production can still be drawn from that
of the clean capacity investment dynamics.
2. We could assume an emissions rate other than 1, but effectively we are normalizing the pollution
stock by the emissions rate.
3. This assumption is made largely for simplicity; we expect our results would apply more generally
to assimilation functions α(S) satisfying α′(S) ≥ 0. The case of α′(S) < 0 is more complex, as
shown in Toman and Withagen (2000).
4. Equivalently, we could assume that capacity installation requires some investment in terms of the
consumption commodity rather than a labor cost. However, this presentation offers a bit more
transparency, since we will effectively be normalizing to the marginal utility of leisure.
5. In other words, capacity cannot be converted into consumption, even a cost. Furthermore, we will
show in Lemma 1 that investment is always positive along the optimal path, to take advantage of
the low marginal costs.
6. For optimal control problems with inequality constraints, see Léonard and Long (1992).
7. Regime VIII could theoretically occur when starting from a dirty environment, when clean
capacity needed early on takes longer to depreciate than pollution takes to assimilate. Exploring
this possibility further will be the subject of future research. Although such severe under-
shooting is unlikely, this assumption effectively restricts our consideration to cases in which
it is impossible.
8. This case of a small initial stock of pollutants is similar to the optimal overshooting model
of Switzer and Salant (1986). Their problem of optimal installation of backstop capacity for
an exhaustible resource is analogous to a scenario without decay of the pollution stock or
depreciation of the backstop. We discuss a more general case.
9. This also effectively relaxes the assumption A3, but regime VIII is not relevant for this case of
starting with a relatively small stock of pollution.
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